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On 22 June the European Council agreed on the need to launch a permanent structured coop-
eration (PESCO) in the field of security and defence. Thus, the last of the discussed initiatives 
on the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) gained political 
support and will be implemented.  
Debates on the CSDP have gained momentum since mid-2016 due to a combination of three 
factors: the UK’s decision to leave the EU, the adoption of the Global Strategy for the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy, and some EU member states’ dislike of Donald Trump, combined 
with the conviction that it is necessary to reduce the EU’s dependence on the USA. The year-
long negotiations have resulted in the creation of military planning and conduct capability, 
the establishment of the European Defence Fund, and of the coordinated annual review on 
defence, and the decision to activate PESCO. 
These initiatives may be an opportunity to increase the military capabilities of EU member 
states and to boost investment or streamline defence spending. However, in an unfavourable 
political situation (involving for example long-term tensions between the USA and the West-
ern European allies), the development of these initiatives may have negative consequences 
for NATO. Therefore, in most states of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea regions, EU initiatives 
are received with great caution. Less inclined to see themselves as part of the eastern flank, 
Poland’s partners from the Visegrad Group are more enthusiastic about the plan to enhance 
cooperation. However, it is not certain whether the new EU initiatives will bring measurable 
results or if they will remain a rather meaningless response to a short-term political demand. 
The drivers for current CSDP’s 
development: Brexit, Trump, EUGS
The security and defence policy of the EU1 has 
been evolving since the 1990s. So far, it has 
focused on civilian and military crisis manage-
ment based on the capabilities of member 
states. The EU has carried out limited civilian 
missions and low intensity military operations 
1 Since the Lisbon Treaty entering into force in 2009 it has 
been referred to as the CSDP. 
in the EU’s eastern and (broadly understood) 
southern neighbourhood (at present nine civil-
ian missions and six military missions and oper-
ations). It has not developed its own command 
structures and the European rapid response 
forces intended for crisis management opera-
tions (the so-called EU Battlegroups) have so far 
not been used. The European Defence Agency 
was intended to be an instrument to strength-
en industrial cooperation between EU member 
states. However, it has supported multilateral 
The CSDP’s renaissance 
Challenges and opportunities for the eastern flank
2OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 243
projects only to a limited extent. The CSDP’s 
limited scope was connected with the unwill-
ingness on the part of some EU member states 
to expand the EU’s competence in this field. 
The UK was the main handbrake since for rea-
sons both political (its close alliance with the 
USA) and pragmatic (additional bureaucracy 
and costs) it did not want NATO structures to 
be duplicated. Since the summer of 2016 the 
debates on the development of the EU’s secu-
rity policy have been undergoing a renaissance 
due to a combination of three factors.
Brexit. After the referendum in which UK de-
cided to leave the EU, Germany and France de-
cided that the best response to the crisis of the 
European project and to Brexit should be to 
enhance cooperation, in particular in the areas 
which spark no major controversy between Ber-
lin and Paris. Within a few days after the British 
referendum, the foreign ministers of Germa-
ny and France published a document entitled 
“A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties” in 
which they pointed to security policy as one of 
the three areas in which EU integration should 
be strengthened. The proposed ideas were clar-
ified by the defence ministers of the two coun-
tries in September 2016 and won support from 
Italy and Spain. One argument for enhancing 
integration in security and defence was that, 
after leaving the EU, the United Kingdom will 
no longer be able to block the development 
of cooperation. 
Trump. The victory of Donald Trump, who has 
been rather unpopular with most EU elites, in 
the US presidential election and the demands 
he has formulated towards the European allies 
have boosted the narrative calling for increased 
military integration within the EU. Some of the 
debates have not been focused on the need 
to increase military spending and strengthen 
trans-Atlantic relations, but on the need to build 
new European structures and capabilities in or-
der for the EU to be able to act independently. 
On the one hand, this narrative is targeted at 
the increasingly anti-American public in West-
ern European states. On the other hand, it re-
flects uncertainty as to the future involvement 
of the USA in guaranteeing Europe’s security. 
EUGS. The European Council’s June 2016 adop-
tion of the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign 
and Security Policy (EUGS), drawn up by Feder-
ica Mogherini, High Representative of the Eu-
ropean Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, came a few days after the referendum in 
the UK. The document that delineates the EU’s 
goals and ambitions in foreign and security poli-
cy has gained importance with the new political 
situation developing in the EU and in the trans- 
-Atlantic relations. The European Commission, 
for its part, has become an important actor in 
the debates on the development of the CSDP, 
although its competence covers this area only 
to a limited degree. Accused of overstepping its 
role of the “guardian of treaties” during Jean-
Claude Juncker’s presidency, it seems to be 
treating the issue of developing the CSDP as one 
of the instruments to expand its competence 
and to support a federalist vision of the EU. 
How much more European Union 
in security and defence? 
The meeting of EU leaders in Bratislava in Sep-
tember 2016 gave a formal impetus to launch 
intensive negotiations on how to further devel-
op the CSDP. The decisions by the Council of the 
EU of November 2016, March and May 2017, 
and the conclusions of the European Council of 
December 2016 and June 2017 were of key im-
portance in this process, in which the European 
Commission played an important role. Federica 
Mogherini not only drew up the EU Global Strat-
The European Commission is actively in-
volved in developing the CSDP – it strives 
to expand its competences and promotes 
a federalist vision of the EU.
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egy, but also proposed a Global Strategy Imple-
mentation Plan on Security and Defence, which 
had largely shaped the 2016 decisions. Other 
important documents included the European 
Commission’s European Defence Action Plan 
of November 2016, and the Reflection paper 
on the future of European defence announced 
in June 2017 as an impetus for a debate on 
the CSDP2. The EU’s year-long work resulted 
in the formulation of initiatives in five areas 
which may foster a new quality of the CSDP: 
(1) Command structures. For many years, the 
creation of a separate command structure for 
EU military missions and operations was a con-
tentious issue with a highly political and sym-
bolic dimension. The creation of this structure 
would mean that the EU would be recognised 
as the second (after NATO) independent actor 
in the field of security and defence in Europe. 
Until recently, it was mainly the United King-
dom that blocked almost all of the initiatives of 
this type. The Brexit decision opened up new 
opportunities for discussions which resulted 
in the June 2017 creation of the military plan-
ning and conduct capability (MPCC). Although 
it is intended only to conduct military training 
missions, in the future it may become the start-
ing point for creating more complex European 
command structures3. 
2 It contains three scenarios: (1) security and defence co-
operation, (2) shared security and defence, (3) common 
defence and security – from an insignificant increase of 
military and industrial-technical cooperation to the cre-
ation of an integrated defence union with the European 
defence market, capable of acting autonomously. In the 
document, the Commission has emphasised its prefer-
ence for the third scenario to be implemented. Europe-
an Commission, The document opening a debate on the 
future direction of defence in an EU of 27, 7 June 2017, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1516_en.htm 
3 Thierry Tardy, MPCC: towards an EU military command?, 
EUISS Brief No 17, 7 June 2017, http://www.iss.europa.
eu/publications/detail/article/mpcc-towards-an-eu-mili-
tary-command/ 
(2) Military-industrial cooperation. Over the 
last two decades, the issue of enhancing mili-
tary-technical cooperation in the EU has been 
a frequent subject of debates and initiatives. 
So far, this cooperation has rather been limit-
ed and its results have received varying assess-
ments4. Due to their separate plans for develop-
ing their armed forces and favouring their own 
armaments industries, the member states in-
tended to become involved in this cooperation 
only to a limited degree. Therefore, the Euro-
pean Commission’s establishment in June 2017 
of the European Defence Fund (EDF) may be 
a breakthrough decision that will accelerate the 
integration processes. Financed from the EU 
budget, the fund may provide the impetus for 
innovative technological programmes carried 
out by arms companies in the EU; this would 
be done by offering grants for multilateral re-
search and development projects. EU member 
states will also be encouraged to cooperate 
since the EDF will offer financial support for 
joint projects aimed at purchasing arms and 
military equipment (up to 20% of the cost, see 
Appendix). However, it is not certain whether 
the EDF will be successful. Experience shows 
that multilateral armament projects are not al-
ways automatically cheaper and more efficient. 
(3) Development of military capabilities. 
Armed forces development and technical mod-
ernisation plans are mainly devised at the na-
tional level. For the member states to be able to 
better identify cooperation areas and partners, 
the EU will introduce a coordinated annual re-
view on defence (CARD). CARD is intended to 
be the basis for preparing the EU’s long-term 
Capability Development Plan for 2018–2025 
and is meant to show what capabilities the 
4 The Strategic Airlift Capability project is one successful 
example – it involves twelve countries jointly purchasing 
and utilising several strategic transport aircraft. Less suc-
cessful initiatives include large multilateral armaments 
projects such as: the A400M transport aircraft, the Euro-
fighter multi-role aircraft, the NH90 helicopter. Despite 
being implemented, many consider them to be negative 
examples of armaments cooperation due to problems 
connected with the difficulties of a multilateral produc-
tion process, the postponement of supply deadlines for 
several years, and the multiplication of costs.
The European Defence Fund may be 
a breakthrough instrument in speeding up 
the EU’s military integration.
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EU will need in the future. As a consequence, 
the EU will introduce a mechanism similar to 
NATO’s Defence Planning Process (NDPP)5. 
(4) Legal mechanisms for enhancing cooper-
ation. Equally important to the establishment 
of the EDF may be the launch of permanent 
structured cooperation (PESCO), an instrument 
introduced to the acquis communautaire by 
the Lisbon Treaty which has not yet been used. 
The debate on activating the mechanism re-
turned in 2016. PESCO is intended to enable 
the interested member states to engage in en-
hanced cooperation on security and defence 
after meeting specific criteria. Pursuant to the 
decision by the European Council of June 2017, 
EU member states have three months to agree 
a common list of criteria and commitments, to-
gether with concrete capability projects, in or-
der to start this cooperation. PESCO is also to be 
combined with CARD and the EDF. Proponents 
of enhancing cooperation within the CSDP view 
PESCO as a symbol of the EU’s new ambitions 
in security and defence, although still there is 
no clear concept regarding what it is intended 
to be (see Appendix).
(5) EU–NATO cooperation. To supplement the 
above-mentioned activities, the EU is enhanc-
ing its cooperation with NATO. At the NATO 
summit in Warsaw in July 2016 an EU-NATO 
Joint Declaration on cooperation was signed in 
seven areas: preventing hybrid threats, opera-
tional cooperation including maritime issues, 
cyber-security and defence, defence capabili-
ties, defence industry and research, the coordi-
nation of exercises, building partners’ capacity 
5 The goal of the NDPP in NATO is to harmonise national 
defence plans for armed forces development by identi-
fying capabilities and promoting their development and 
acquisition by Allies.
and resilience in the EU’s and NATO’s southern 
and eastern neighbourhood. Detailed coopera-
tion areas were formulated in December 2016, 
when 42 proposals were announced6. In princi-
ple, the cooperation between the EU and NATO 
does not create any new quality and mainly 
focuses on the enhanced coordination of the 
activities of the two organisations. It is also in-
tended to demonstrate that the EU does not 
intend to build an alternative military alliance 
and that the CSDP is complementary to NATO’s 
activities. 
The perspective from EU’s and NATO’s 
eastern flank 
Most states of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea 
regions approach the new CSDP initiatives with 
a high degree of caution, whereas Poland’s 
partners from the Visegrad Group have ex-
pressed considerable support for them. Over 
recent years, most of the eastern flank countries 
were strongly involved in implementing the 
decisions made at the Newport NATO summit 
(2014) and in negotiations and preparation of 
decisions of the Warsaw NATO summit (2016). 
Therefore, they were not particularly involved 
in the process of drawing up the EUGS, which 
was dominated by the EU’s southern members. 
In the new political reality this document has 
become the basis for initiating actions on the 
EU level instead of being another EU strategy 
that would merely be filed following its adop-
tion, as had been expected. 
In the Baltic Sea region most of the countries 
are treating the development of the CSDP with 
caution, fearing that NATO and trans-Atlantic 
relations may be weakened as a result. How-
ever, they have expressed their support for the 
CSDP since they want to remain in the main-
6 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions 
on the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the 
European Council, the President of the European Com-
mission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation, 6 December 2016, http://www.consil-
ium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/06-eu-na-
to-joint-declaration/ 
Poland, the Baltic states and Romania are 
among those countries which approach 
CSDP initiatives with great caution.
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stream of European integration and have lim-
ited political elbow room to block initiatives. 
The Baltic states are the most striking examples 
of this line of thinking. After the Brexit vote, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia can no longer 
count on support from the UK in blocking the 
initiatives; nor do they want to object to the 
EU’s biggest member states (France, Germany) 
and which are also their important allies with-
in NATO. Therefore, they support the idea of 
enhancing military cooperation within the EU – 
on condition that this would lead to an increase 
in defence spending and a boost in military ca-
pabilities, and would not duplicate NATO.
Sweden supports the development of the EU’s 
civilian and military crisis management instru-
ments, but it is rather sceptical about enhanc-
ing a structured military cooperation within the 
EU for reasons similar to those cited by Poland 
and the Baltic states. Despite not being a NATO 
member, it recognises the USA as the guarantor 
of European and regional security and would 
not like trans-Atlantic relations to be weakened 
or for NATO activities to be duplicated, since 
it closely cooperates with NATO in the region. 
Stockholm expressed its support for devel-
oping the CSDP in June 20177, but it has not 
formulated any precise stance towards most 
of the initiatives. The reason behind this move 
was Sweden’s eagerness to be part of the EU’s 
mainstream and to enhance its cooperation 
7 See the article by Sweden’s ministers of foreign affairs, 
Margot Wallström, and defence, Peter Hultqvist, Vi vill ag-
era för att stärka EU:s försvarssamarbete, Dagens Nyheter, 
20 June 2017, http://www.regeringen.se/debattartiklar/ 
2017/06/vi-vill-agera-for-att-starka-eus-forsvarssamarbete/ 
(albeit in the bilateral rather than the EU-wide 
context) with Germany which is a proponent 
of developing the CSDP. Finland, for its part, 
has from the beginning been an active partic-
ipant in the debate on the future of the CSDP. 
As a periphery non-allied state, it views inte-
gration under the CSDP as an opportunity to 
strengthen its own security (it views its mem-
bership of the Eurozone along similar lines)8. 
Helsinki wants EU initiatives to become a tool 
to step up the defence capabilities of member 
states and is interested in taking part in con-
crete projects focused on satellite communi-
cations, the navy, logistics and cyber defence. 
In addition, it is interested in enhancing coop-
eration in the field of hybrid threats and would 
welcome increased cooperation between EU 
and NATO member states in its newly created 
European Centre of Excellence for Countering 
Hybrid Threats based in Helsinki.
In the Black Sea region the cautious approach 
that Poland and the Baltic states are taking 
to the development of the CSDP is shared by 
Romania. Bucharest has raised the need for the 
CSDP to be transparent and complementary to 
NATO and for trans-Atlantic relations to remain 
strong. Romania fears that the EU’s ties with 
the USA (Romania’s strategic ally) may weak-
en. However, it has also expressed its wish to 
become involved in the process of enhancing 
security and defence cooperation in the EU, as 
it fears that a multi-speed Europe may be cre-
ated. In the debates over the CSDP, Romania 
is interested in increasing the effectiveness of 
crisis management, cyber-security and the de-
velopment of strategic communication (in the 
context of Russian propaganda expansion in 
Moldova). It also has great expectations for the 
creation of the EDF, as it is seeking mechanisms 
8 In June 2016, Finland and France issued a joint decla-
ration on strengthening the EU’s CSDP. Finland is able 
to co-shape this process at the EU level through the in-
volvement of Jyrki Katainen, Vice-President of the Euro-
pean Commission, and Lt General Esa Pulkkinen, Direc-
tor General of the European Union Military Staff since 
May 2016 and designated head of MPCC.
The support for the CSDP expressed by 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hunga-
ry is intended to demonstrate that these 
countries want to be part of the main-
stream of European integration.
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to support its plans to modernise the army and 
revitalise the defence industry. Bulgaria, for its 
part, is not an active participant in the debate 
on the CSDP; nor is this issue an element of the 
internal debate. However, it has expressed its 
support for integration processes and at the 
same time pointed to the need to maintain EU– 
–NATO cooperation in the Black Sea region and 
in the Western Balkans. 
Poland’s partners from the Visegrad Group 
support the plan to enhance military integra-
tion within the EU. The reasons behind this 
approach are as follows: they strive to remain 
in the mainstream of European integration; 
they want to present a positive and integration- 
-oriented agenda that could divert attention 
from their objection to the common migration 
and asylum policy; they believe that the new 
initiatives have limited impact on their military 
security, insignificant armed forces and arms 
industries. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary do not really consider themselves to 
be part of NATO’s eastern flank and they do not 
perceive any direct military threat from Russia. 
Moreover, Slovakia and Hungary are less in-
clined to view the USA as the guarantor of their 
security. Therefore, these states do not see any 
potential challenges related to developing the 
CSDP, although they emphasise that responsibil-
ity for European security should lie with NATO. 
At the same time, in the EU-wide debate they 
are trying to push through issues they consider 
important, such as cyber-security, preventing 
hybrid threats and developing new technologies 
(the Czech Republic) or preventing migration, 
countering the terrorist threat and offering sup-
port to the Western Balkans (Hungary). 
The development of the CSDP has received the 
strongest support from the Czech Republic. 
Czech politicians have frequently raised this 
issue in the EU – the Czech government co- 
-organised a high-level conference summing up 
the CSDP initiatives in Prague (June 2017) and 
the Czech Prime Minister co-authored an article 
with the President of the European Commission 
on the development of the CSDP9. In Slovakia, 
the ongoing debate is focused on the general 
issue of “being in the core of the EU” – without 
precisely defining what this core is (albeit with 
awareness of the fact that it will also include in-
tegration in security and defence). In Hungary, 
the CSDP is not covered in public debate and 
the new initiatives have been receiving scant 
attention, even from expert groups. 
The challenges and opportunities
In the short term, the focus on implementing 
the CSDP initiatives may have a negative impact 
on processes within NATO which are aimed 
at boosting collective defence in the Baltic and 
the Black Sea regions. 
• NATO is shifting its focus from conducting 
crisis management operations to regaining 
the capabilities needed for collective defence. 
This entails changes in NATO’s command and 
force structure, in defence planning and in 
the capabilities of the national armed forces 
(expanding their armoured, artillery and air de-
fence potential as well as increasing their com-
bat readiness level). 
• In the Baltic and the Black Sea regions, the 
process of boosting the allied presence is be-
ing continued. Western European allies along 
with the USA participate in joint exercises and 
enhanced forward presence in Poland and the 
Baltic states, as well as in Romania and Bulgaria.
9 Jean-Claude Juncker, Bohuslav Sobotka, Europe Must 
Take Its Defense Into Its Own Hands, The Wall Street 
Journal, 5 June 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-
must-take-its-defense-into-its-own-hands-1496688441 
The trend to enhance military cooperation 
in the EU is visible and will be continued 
regardless of the implementation of CSDP 
initiatives.
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• A debate on burden-sharing is underway 
in NATO. At the meeting of NATO leaders in 
Brussels in May 2017 a decision was made to 
adopt annual national plans to monitor pro-
gress and set goals regarding the gradual in-
crease of defence spending up to 2% of GDP, 
to invest additional funding in key military ca-
pabilities and to contribute to NATO missions, 
operations and other engagements. 
In the long term, the new CSDP initiatives will 
generate a series of challenges for the eastern 
flank states. Nevertheless, if cooperation within 
the EU is given the right format, they may also 
generate opportunities for building military ca-
pabilities, in EU–NATO and trans-Atlantic rela-
tions, and for arms industries. 
What capabilities? The EU’s Global Strategy 
defines three areas of EU involvement: respond-
ing to external conflicts and crises, building 
partners’ capacities, and protecting the EU and 
its citizens. All this implies that the EU will fo-
cus on civilian and military crisis management. 
From the perspective of the eastern flank, the 
question arises as to whether military coopera-
tion in the EU should focus solely on developing 
crisis management capabilities and on building 
units for operations of this type, or if should 
it also support cooperation enhancing collec-
tive defence – in coordination with NATO. 
Competing with or complementing NATO? 
Doubts emerge regarding the relation between 
the new CSDP instruments and the existing 
NATO mechanisms. The coordinated annual 
review on defence (CARD), the EU’s long-term 
Capability Development Plan and the perma-
nent structured cooperation (PESCO) are in-
tended to harmonise and support the military 
capabilities planning of the EU member states. 
On the one hand, these initiatives may be 
viewed as being in competition with NATO’s 
Defence Planning Process. For Western Europe, 
reinforcing EU crisis management capabili-
ties in the south may gradually become more 
important than rebuilding NATO’s collective 
defence capabilities in the east. On the other 
hand, CARD could significantly complement 
NDPP, for example by meeting NATO’s require-
ments in the framework of the EU’s planning 
process (with additional support from the EDF 
and PESCO).
Weakening or strengthening the trans-Atlan-
tic bond? Western Europe’s rising scepticism 
and distance towards Washington may lead to 
a long-term striving for greater emancipation of 
the EU in security and defence. This may have 
negative consequences for the coherence of and 
cooperation within NATO, and hence for the 
eastern flank. The political rhetoric regarding 
the EU’s strategic security and defence autono-
my is not (and will not be for a long time) reflect-
ed in EU possessing sufficient collective defence 
capabilities or being capable of conducting cri-
sis management operations of high intensity. 
On the other hand, the new EU initiatives, such 
as CARD, the EDF and PESCO, may give EU mem-
ber states additional impetus to increase their 
investments in defence, which in turn will be 
welcomed by Washington and could contribute 
to alleviating the trans-Atlantic tensions.
Oligopolisation or a revival of the Europe-
an arms industry? Some of the eastern flank 
states view the European Defence Fund (EDF) 
as an instrument that will mainly serve the big 
arms companies of the EU’s largest states to 
boost their competitive advantage and market 
reach at the cost of less competitive and small-
er companies from the region. For small states 
from the eastern flank, in particular those 
which do not have their own arms industries, 
the EDF may in turn generate additional oppor-
tunities for advancing technical modernisation 
of their armed forces, as it offers co-financing 
of joint development and the acquisition of 
defence equipment and technology. However, 
a number of details regarding the EDF still 
needs clarification10. 
10 Marcin Terlikowski, European Defence Fund: financial 
support for the EU defence industry, PISM Spotlight, 
12 June 2017, http://www.pism.pl/publications/spot-
light/no-26-2017, European Commission, A European 
Defence Fund: €5.5 billion per year to boost Europe’s 
defence capabilities, Press Release, 7 June 2017, http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1508_en.htm
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It is not certain whether the present renais-
sance of the CSDP will serve as an impetus for 
EU member states to genuinely enhance their 
cooperation within the EU, boost their military 
capabilities and increase or streamline their 
defence spending, or whether it will bring no 
measurable military results. Undoubtedly, the 
trend to enhance military cooperation in Eu-
rope is visible and cooperation projects will 
be carried out in NATO, in the EU, and outside 
these structures in bi- and multilateral formats. 
CSDP initiatives in detail
1. Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)
The MPCC is intended to assume command of EU non-executive military missions, i.e. train-
ing missions in Somalia, the Central African Republic and Mali. The MPCC is not a strategic-level 
operational command to be involved in planning and conducting the EU’s military combat mis-
sions11, as requested by some member states, but is a small 30-employee-strong centre whose task 
will be to plan and conduct the EU’s ‘non-combat’ missions. It is expected that it will not generate 
additional costs and that it will hire staff from other present structures (EU military staff) or from 
defunct structures (EU Operating Centre). 
2. The European Defence Fund (EDF)
The European Defence Fund has two strands. (1) Approx. 90 million euros (until 2020) and 500 
million euros annually (post-2020) will be available to the EDF for full and direct financing of col-
laborative research in innovative defence technologies and products. (2) Approx. 500 million euros 
from the EU budget until 2020 and up to 5 billion euros annually post-2020 (1 billion euros from 
the EU budget and the remainder from member state contributions) will be available to the EDF 
for co-financing joint development and the acquisition of defence equipment and technology12. 
The first short-term European Defence Industrial Development Programme is being negotiated be-
fore medium-term comprehensive programmes will be drafted.
The EDF’s goal is to increase the EU’s strategic autonomy, i.e. to make it independent of the key US 
military capabilities. A number of priorities have been defined to date: unmanned aerial vehicles, 
aerial refuelling, satellite communications and cyber-security capabilities. The EDF is intended to 
support member states in acquiring these capabilities. An additional goal is to seek savings and 
synergies in the armaments policies of EU member states whose defence spending continues to fall 
short (the average figure for the EU28 is 1.34% of GDP). 
11 There will be no change in how the operations will be planned and conducted, i.e. by appointed national command 
structures (French, German, Greek, Italian and British, and recently also Polish). So far, the EU has not taken advantage of 
NATO structures; it is entitled to do so under the Berlin Plus formula. 
12 European Commission, Launching the European Defence Fund, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 7 June 2017, 
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/23605
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3. Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)
EU member states are expected to present data regarding their defence spending, technical mod-
ernisation plans, and defence research efforts. A comparative analysis of this data will make it pos-
sible to draw up recommendations for possible cooperation and, in the long term, to coordinate 
the development of military capabilities. The first review is expected to be launched in the autumn 
of 2017 (the test stage) and in the autumn of 2019 (full scope).
4. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
PESCO was established pursuant to article 42 section 6 and article 46 of the Treaty on European 
Union and to the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation (Protocol No 10). The criteria for 
participation in PESCO defined in the Protocol include: member states’ commitment to set a specific 
level of investment expenditure on defence equipment; the harmonisation of modernisation plans 
and capabilities development; enhancing the availability, interoperability and deployability of mem-
ber states’ forces; the commitment to make good the shortfalls in military capabilities (including 
by taking part in multinational projects); participation in European Defence Agency programmes.
The debates on PESCO frequently include arguments to focus the cooperation on developing crit-
ical capabilities. This would involve the joint purchase and operation of a specific type of military 
equipment (for example unmanned aerial systems, satellites, reconnaissance planes, frigates or new 
generation fighter jets). PESCO could subsequently serve the purpose of developing joint land, air 
or naval forces units13.
13 Sven Biscop, Oratio pro PESCO, Egmont Paper 91, 23 January 2017, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/publication_article/
oratio-pro-pesco/
